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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
SALES AND USE TAX
The most significant sales and use tax case decided by the
appellate courts during the current term is probably the most
significant tax case of recent years. In Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Cocreham1 the Louisiana Supreme Court had under
consideration the application of the Louisiana sales and use
tax to plaintiff contractor during the period between De-
cember 1, 1955, and December 31, 1960. The court found that
during the taxable period the taxpayer, an Illinois corpora-
tion authorized to do business and doing business in Louisi-
ana, was engaged in the business of constructing specialized
steel plate structures, such as storage tanks, generally for
municipalities and corporations. The structures built by the
taxpayer consisted primarily of fabricated steel plates assem-
bled by the taxpayer's employees on prepared foundations at
the job site. The taxpayer purchased unfinished steel plates
from out-of-state suppliers and carried them to out-of-state
shops where the steel plates were fabricated with labor and
overhead expenses paid by the taxpayer. After fabrication
the steel plates were usually transported at the taxpayer's
expense from its out-of-state shops by common carrier to
Louisiana job sites. The taxpayer had paid use taxes on the
purchase price paid to its out-of-state vendors for the
unfinished steel plates. The collector claimed that the trans-
portation expense paid to transport the fabricated steel
plates to the Louisiana job site was includable in the tax
base. The taxpayer disagreed, but paid the tax under protest
in 1964 and timely filed suit for refund. The collector recon-
vened in August 1967, claiming additional taxes on the
grounds that the expenses of labor and shop overhead in
fabricating the steel plates were also includable in the tax
base. He claimed in addition a ten percent attorney's fee on
the total amount involved in litigation.
The supreme court concluded that both labor and shop
overhead and freight (transportation charges) were includ-
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. 317 So. 2d 605 (La. 1975).
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able in the tax base, but that to that extent the statute was
unconstitutional. The true significance of the case lies not in
the court's conclusion that Chicago Bridge and Iron was not
liable for the additional use tax, but in its statement that had
the labor and shop overhead and freight been incurred by an
in-state manufacturer-user no tax would have been due.
Under Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily,2 the out-
of-state manufacturer-user could not be so discriminated
against.
Although the department had made a concerted effort 3 to
develop the theory of a value added tax on intrastate labor
and shop overhead in the decade following Halliburton, the
court found from the sales tax law, the regulations, the
Halliburton stipulation and the evidence that the legislature
had not placed a use tax, or value added tax, upon the cost of
intrastate labor and shop overhead. In reaching its conclu-
sion concerning the freight, the court alluded to the decision
of the first circuit in Mouton v. Klatex,4 and while not spe-
cifically overruling the decision found it neither controlling
nor persuasive.
Given the history of the statute, the position expressly
and impliedly taken by the department in the years preced-
ing Halliburton, and the reasoning of the United States Su-
preme Court in Halliburton, the decision appears eminently
correct and leaves to the legislature rather than the depart-
ment the question of whether a value added tax is to be a part
of the state's taxing scheme. It is unfortunate that the court
chose not to settle the conflict between the two panels of the
first circuit concerning attorney's fees 5 and pretermitted a
decision on the merits of Chicago Bridge & Iron's exception of
prescription to the collector's reconventional demand, but
these shortcomings, if shortcomings they be, are more than
offset by the thorough and scholarly treatment afforded the
main issues in the suit.
In Traigle v. Parish of Calcasieu6 and Parish of Calcasieu
v. Traigle7 the courts considered liability for sales taxes,
2. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
3. See Louisiana General Sales Tax Rules & Regulations arts. 2-3 (Au-
gust 1, 1963).
4. 238 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
5. See text following note 15 to note 18, infra.
6. 296 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
7. 296 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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penalties, interest and attorney's fees arising out of the con-
struction of an aluminum plant under the provisions of the
Louisiana Industrial Inducement Act.8 Relying on an opinion
of the district attorney for Calcasieu Parish that sales taxes
were not due, neither the contractor (lessee) nor the parish of
Calcasieu (lessor) had paid sales taxes on materials purchased
for use in the construction of the plant in question.
In the first case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal found
that under the sales tax law the parish was clearly liable for
the taxes, that the contractor had assumed the liability for
such taxes under the specific terms of its lease agreement,
and that interest, penalties and attorney's fees were due.
The court indicated that despite Collector of Revenue v. J.
L. Richardson9 it did not believe good faith was a defense
against penalties, citing Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of
Revenue' 0 and St. John the Baptist Parish School Board v.
Marbury-Pattillo Construction Co.," but concluded that even
if Richardson was good law, the contractor was not in good
faith. The court refused to find estoppel on the basis of the
legal advice given to the parish, citing Claiborne Sales, in
which the supreme court had held that estoppel did not even
apply to contrary advice given by an agent of the collector.The court did find that the increase in interest rate from
six to twelve percent occasioned by the adoption of Act 663 of
197012 was prospective only and applied only to taxes becom-
ing due after the effective date of the act. Although it cited no
authority, this conclusion is clearly supported by earlier jur-
isprudence, particularly Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Svolos.'3
On rehearing the court allowed the claim against the parish
and adhered to its opinion relative to interest and penalties,
reserving to the parish the right to apply for a rehearing.1 4
While the parish met the general definition of dealer con-
tained in the sales tax law, Louisiana law seems to be well
settled that a contractor is the consumer of materials pur-
chased for use in a contract to improve immovable property.' 5
8. LA. R.S. 39:991 (Supp. 1964).
9. 247 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
10. 233 La. 1061, 90 So. 2d 345 (1957).
11. 259 La. 1133, 254 So. 2d 607 (1971).
12. La. Acts 1970, No. 663, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 47:1601 (1950).
13. 258 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
14. Traigle v. Parish of Calcasieu, 302 So. 2d 921 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
15. St. John the Baptist Parish School Bd. v. Marbury-Pattillo Construc-
tion Co., 259 La. 1133, 254 So. 2d 607 (1971); Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of
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Hence, the position taken in the dissent that under these
circumstances the parish was not liable appears to be the
better legal position.
The case before the first circuit involved a portion of the
taxes paid under protest by. the parish and others. The plain-
tiffs filed suit to recover within the prescribed time and the
collector reconvened for the ten percent statutory attorney's
fee provided by Louisiana R.S. 47:1512. In addition to ques-
tioning the applicability of Act 663 of 1970, increasing the
penalty interest rate, the plaintiffs raised questions concern-
ing compromise, imputation of payment, imposition of penal-
ties when failure to pay was in good faith, and imposition of
attorney's fees when taxes are paid under protest. The court
found no compromise or remission or improper imputation
under the evidence. In view of the very limited compromise
authority granted the collector by Louisiana R.S. 47:1578, it is
at least questionable that any evidence could have justified a
conclusion that the state's claim had been compromised or
remitted.
The court found the attorney's fees provided by Louisiana
R.S. 47:1512 were penalties not favored in the law or to be
imposed except in cases that are free and clear from any
doubt. Having reached this conclusion, it was fairly easy for
the court to construe Louisiana R.S. 47:1512 in pari materia
with the payment under protest provision,16 concluding that
attorney's fees are not compensable when the taxpayer pays
taxes under protest and files suit for recovery. This conclu-
sion appears to be not only equitable but also sound. It is
unfortunate that the Louisiana Supreme Court did not settle
the conflict between this reasoning and the reasoning of
another panel in the first circuit 17 reaching the opposite con-
clusion in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Cocreham.18 Without
discussing the availability vel non of good faith as a defense
in sales tax penalty cases, the first circuit concluded, as had
the third, that there was no showing of good faith in the case
before it.
The question of attorney's fees was also one of several
Revenue, 233 La. 1061, 90 So. 2d 345 (1957); State v. J. Watts Kearney & Sons,
181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1935).
16. LA. R.S. 47:1576 (1950).
17. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Cocreham, 303 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1974).
18. 317 So. 2d 605 (La. 1975). See text at notes 1-5, supra.
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issues in the case of Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets
v. Mouton.19 In that matter the district court had before it two
cases, one involving an appeal from a judgment of the Board
of Tax Appeals affirming certain assessments for taxes made
by the collector and the other involving a rule for taxes,
interest and attorney's fees filed by the collector. The cases
were consolidated in the trial court and it rendered judgment
in favor of the collector for the taxes, interest and attorney's
fees claimed while allowing Schwegmann vendor's compensa-
tion for the additional taxes owed.
The evidence showed that the taxpayer's attorney had
represented the department in the Board of Tax Appeals
proceeding, appellate number 6398, as a full time attorney for
the department, but subsequently left the department and
was employed as private counsel. The court declined to award
attorney's fees on the basis of the dictum by the supreme court
in Daspit v. Sinclair Refining Co.,20 finding that the term
"private counsel" does not encompass salaried attorneys. It
did, however, allow the attorney's fees in appellate number
6399, saying that "there is no indication that the present
private counsel performed any work in case number 6399 of
our docket while he was employed by the collector." 21 It would
have been preferable to have adopted the public policy ar-
gument adverted to in the Daspit dictum and to have refused
any attorney's fees whatsoever under the circumstances. 22 On
the main issue involved, the court sustained the collector's
assessment of additional taxes on the basis of asserted excess
collection of the two percent tax, primarily on the ground that
Schwegmann had failed to produce evidence to justify over-
turning the assessments made by the collector. The facts
recited in the opinion would appear to have supported the
assessment on any of the three bases argued by the collector:
an analysis of the bracket schedule used the experience of
similar businesses and the test audit made by the depart-
ment. The court further held, quite correctly, that vendor's
compensation under Louisiana R.S. 47:306A is allowed only
when the amount due is not delinquent at the time of pay-
ment, and reversed that portion of the judgment below allow-
19. 309 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
20. 198 La. 9, 3 So. 2d 259 (1941).
21. 309 So. 2d at 694.
22. It should be pointed out that this opinion was not shared by Judge
Lemmon who would have awarded the attorney's fees in both cases.
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ing such compensation. In addition, the court joined the first
circuit in deciding that Act 663 of 197023 increasing the inter-
est rate was not retroactive and therefore not applicable to
taxes assessed prior to its passage.
In Putch v. Collector of Revenue, 24 the taxpayers, owners
of coin-operated amusement devices, paid under protest cer-
tain sales taxes claimed by the state and filed suit to recover
in Caddo Parish, a forum apparently more to the taxpayers'
liking than the tax collector's. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal reversed the judgment of the district court overruling
the collector's exception of improper venue and transferred
the case to the Parish of East Baton Rouge, the collector's
official domicile. 25
That the collector may have won the battle but lost the
war, at least in this particular area, seems clear from a deci-
sion of the First Circuit Court of Appeal rendered several
months later in Barbin v. Department of Revenue, 28 holding
that the proceeds from the operation of coin-operated
amusement devices do not come within the purview of the
Louisiana sales and use taxes.2 7 Although the court cited no
authority, the language of the statute and the department's
position for the past quarter century clearly support the con-
clusion.
INHERITANCE TAXES
In Succession of Bright,2 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal construed a provision in a will that all debts and taxes
were to be paid out of the residuary estate as requiring the
division of the residue before the imposition of taxes. Since
Bright involved an individual residuary legatee and a tax
exempt charitable legatee, the effect was to increase the
charitable deduction for federal estate tax purposes under
Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code. 29
Succession of Christina3 ° concluded that the inheritance
tax must be based on the revised inventory figure agreed to
23. La. Acts 1970, No. 663, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 47:1601 (1950).
24. 299 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
25. LA. R.S. 47:1511 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 168, § 1.
26. 307 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
27. LA. R.S. 47:301-23 (1950), as amended.
28. 300 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
29. LeVan, 1 THE LOUISIANA ESTATE PLANNER 14 (1974).
30. 299 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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for federal estate tax purposes rather than on the original
inventory approved by the attorney for the state tax collec-
tor. There the tax had not been paid prior to the revision and
the court indicated that perhaps the state would have been
estopped had payment been made. That conclusion appears to
run counter to the general rule that estoppel does not apply
to the state in tax matters. 31 To the extent that any estate
transfer taxes were due the present law makes it clear that
the additional payment would also be due.3 2 The court also
found the interest provided by Louisiana R.S. 47:2420 to be
true interest rather than penalty. Accordingly, the reduction
effected by Act 513 of 197233 was prospective only and not
available since the testator had died prior to the adoption of
the act.
INCOME TAXES
The constitutional term "net income" does not prohibit
Louisiana from collecting income tax on sums paid as federal
income tax. So held the Louisiana Supreme Court in Stream
v. Collector of Revenue.34 The able dissent of Justice Summers
to the contrary notwithstanding, the decision in Stream was
foreshadowed by earlier decisions of the appellate courts indi-
cating that deductions for federal income taxes are a matter
of legislative grace.3 The observation contained in Justice
Barham's dissent that the decision effectively permits the
legislature by simple majority to impose a tax which would
otherwise require a two-thirds vote was apparently antici-
pated by the constitutional convention and the 1974 constitu-
tion now requires a two-thirds vote to change exemptions. 36
Furthermore, the deductibility of federal income taxes is ex-
pressly provided for in section 4 of Article 7 of the 1974 Con-
stitution.
SEVERANCE TAXES
In the improvement of the Lafayette Regional Airport,
some two and three-quarter million tons of sand and gravel
31. Claiborne Sales Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 233 La. 1061, 90 So. 2d 345
(1957).
32. LA. R.S. 47:2452 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 315, § 3.
33. See also La. Acts 1973, No. 202, amending LA. R.S. 47:2420 (1950).
34. 296 So. 2d 274 (La. 1974); La. Const. art. X, § 1 (1921).
35. W. Horace Williams Co. v. Cocreham, 214 La. 520, 38 So. 2d 157 (1948);
Truckline Gas Co. v. Collector of Revenue, 182 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
36. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
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were moved by hydraulic dredging from parish-owned prop-
erty abutting the airport to the airport proper. Despite hav-
ing earlier lost an effort to collect severance taxes from the
City of Lake Charles in a somewhat similar situation,37 the
collector sought to collect one hundred thirty-three thousand
dollars in severance taxes plus penalty, interest and attor-
ney's fees in Traigle v. Lafayette Airport Commission.38 The
court properly found that the severance tax was not a prop-
erty tax but rather an excise tax on the privilege of severing
and that the imposition of the tax upon a public body violated
no constitutional provisions.
The court found that under the facts of the case there
was no severance but merely a relocation not subject to tax.
The dissent felt that in light of the distance moved and the
different purpose served by the sand and gravel, there was in
fact a severance. 39 Although the Lake Charles case can be
readily distinguished on its facts, the result in the Lafayette
case was the same: the public body paid no severance tax.
CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX
Under the Louisiana corporation franchise tax law,40 cer-
tain stocks and bonds are allocated "to the state in which
they have their business situs or, in the absence of a business
situs, to the state in which is located the commercial domicile
of the taxpayer. ' 41 In North Baton Rouge Development Co. v.
Collector of Revenue,42 a development company, a Louisiana
corporation, was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Louisiana
and Arkansas Railway Company, a Delaware corporation
with its principal office in Missouri. The railway company in
turn was a subsidiary of another corporation. The develop-
ment company's only office was in East Baton Rouge Parish,
three of its four officers were located in Louisiana and the
charter provided that the annual stockholders meeting was to
be held in Shreveport, Louisiana. During the years in ques-
tion, certain stocks were purchased in the name of North
Baton Rouge Development Company. The decisions to pur-
37. Agerto v. City of Lake Charles, 273 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
38. 309 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 909.
40. LA. R.S. 47:601-16 (1950).
41. LA. R.S. 47:606 A(1Xh) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 237,
§ 1.
42. 304 So. 2d 293, 298 (La. 1974).
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chase the stocks were made by management of the parent
company and financing was obtained by or through it. The
certificates were kept in Missouri. North Baton Rouge De-
velopment had no office in Missouri or in any other state, did
no business in any other state, and filed no income or fran-
chise tax returns in any state other than Louisiana. Where
should the stocks have been allocated?
The stocks did not acquire a business situs. "If North
Baton Rouge Development Company can be said to have a
commercial domicile in any place, it is in Louisiana and Loui-
siana alone,"43 said the court. Considering the statute in-
volved, the decision appears to be the only one which logically
could have been reached. The difficulty, of course, is that the
theory of commercial domicile was developed to cover cases in
which corporations have a legal domicile in one state but
management functions and the business is conducted in
another.44 Realistically, the stocks here had no business situs
and the corporation really had no commercial domicile-only
a legal domicile where its very limited activities took place.
The difficulty encountered in this case could have been
avoided had the statute allocated stocks to the commercial
domicile of the corporation or in the absence of a commercial
domicile, to its legal domicile.
PROPERTY TAXES
Of the five cases involving tax titles, the tax sales were
upheld in three45 and declared null in two 46 on the basis of the
well established principles that certain defects in tax sales
may be cured by constitutional peremption, that the burden
of invalidating a tax sale is on the party attacking the sale,
and that an insufficient property description renders a tax
sale null and void and not subject to cure by constitutional
peremption.
In Louisiana & Arkansas R.R. v. Goslin,47 the railroad
43. Id. at 298.
44. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
45. Gram Realty Co., Inc. v. Northern Homes, Inc., 308 So. 2d 502 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975); Northern Homes, Inc. v. Gram Realty Co., Inc., 308 So. 2d
205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975); Crain v. C. W. Vanderdoes Estate, 307 So. 2d 157
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
46. Lasseigne v. Clement, 311 So. 2d 600 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Verret v.
Norwood, 311 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
47. 300 So. 2d 483 (La. 1974). The case had been before the court earlier at
258 La. 530, 246 So. 2d 852 (1971).
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attacked the validity of a two-mill Red River Waterway Dis-
trict tax on the ground that it was unconstitutional, illegal
and discriminatory. The evidence showed that the district
included only seven of the ten parishes bordering the river
and that the seven parishes within the district assessed and
collected taxes on varying and unequal percentages of the
actual cash value of the property in each of the parishes. All
of these, incidentally, were less than the values upon which
the railroad's assessment and tax levy were based. The
court found little difficulty in.deciding that the omission of
the three parishes did not constitute discriminatory treat-
ment of the other seven, concluding that the evidence proved
practical and reasonable grounds for excluding the three
parishes since none would receive any substantial naviga-
tional benefits from the project. On the surface at least, this
conclusion seems to be in accord with well established con-
stitutional principles. 48
The court went on to find that the railroad was in the
public utility class, that taxes were uniform on that class
throughout the territorial limits of the taxing authority
within the requirements of section 1 of Article 10 of the Loui-
siana Constitution of 1921, and that there had been no show-
ing that the railroads were caused to pay an unfairly dispro-
portionate share of the tax burden. The court brushed aside
the variations in the practices affecting non-utility properties
throughout the district as irrelevant to the case at hand. In
answer to the railroad's contention that it was being arbitrar-
ily taxed to support local improvements from which it derived
no benefit, the court found that there would be a substantial
benefit to the railroad from the economic development of the
area and that no special benefit to each property within the
district is required. One wonders why neither the trial court
nor the supreme court discussed the question of general ben-
efit to the three untaxed parishes from the economic de-
velopment of the area in their discussions on this point.
The court's conclusion that a general ad valorem tax on a
railroad taxpayer along with other taxpayers does not gener-
ally constitute an unlawful burden on interstate commerce is
well supported by the jurisprudence. 49 Although the opinion
48. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910); Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp.
v. Fontenot, 225 La. 166, 72 So. 2d 465 (1954); State v. Arthur Duvic's Sons,
185 La. 647, 170 So. 23 (1936).
49. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., and cases therein cited, 336
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by Justice Tate, as usual, is well constructed and technically
sound, the decision appears to the writer to represent a re-
treat, for better or worse, from the philosophy underlying the
court's decision in Bussie v. Long.50
U.S. 169, 69 S. Ct. 432, 93 L. Ed. 585 (1949); Williamson Marine Transport, Inc.
v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 293 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
50. 257 La. 623, 243 So. 2d 776 (1971).
